Judicial Review of Court's Decision
The Supreme Court, in Tata Cellular v. Union of India
(1994) 6 SCC 651 was concerned with the extent of judicial
review of decisions bona fide arrived at in tender cases and on
a review of case law it was inter alia held that:-
(i) there are inherent limitations in exercise of power of judicial review;
(ii) judicial review is a great weapon in the hands of the judges; but the judges must observe the constitutional limits set by our parliamentary system upon the exercise of this beneficent power;
(iii) the restraint has two contemporary manifestations - one is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the court's ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits;
(iv) these restrains bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action;
(v) judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision-making process itself;
(vi) unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power;
(vii) that the concern of the Court while exercising the power CWP-8015-2017 -51- of judicial review should be confined to, (a) whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers; (b) committed an error of law; (c) committed a breach of the rules of natural justice;(d) reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or; (e) abused its powers;
(viii) therefore, it is not for the Court to determine whether a particular policy or a particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair;
(ix) the Court is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken;
(x) if the decision-maker understood correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and has given effect to it, his decision cannot be said to be illegal, inviting interference;
(xi) a decision would be regarded as unreasonable if it is impartial and unequal in its operation;
(xii) a decision taken after taking into account all the factors which ought to be taken into account is ordinarily not to be held as unreasonable;
(xiii) if the scope of judicial review is too broad it would turn the various authorities/agencies into little more than media for transmission of cases to the courts and that would destroy the value of the agencies created to secure the benefit of special knowledge acquired through continuous administration in complicated fields;
(xiv) it is not the function of a Judge to act as a super board or with the zeal of a pedantic schoolmaster substituting its judgment for that of the administrator;
(xv) no judicial review by the non-expert Judge is permitted of the discretion exercised by the expert; and,
(xvi) if a Court were to review fully the decision of a body such as a State Board of medical examiners, it would find itself wandering amid the mazes of therapeutics of boggling at the mysteries of the pharmacopoeia - such a situation is not a case of the blind leading the blind but of one who has always been deaf and blind insisting that he can see and hear better than one who has always had his eyesight and hearing and has always used them to the utmost advantage in ascertaining the truth in regard to the matter in question.
(i) there are inherent limitations in exercise of power of judicial review;
(ii) judicial review is a great weapon in the hands of the judges; but the judges must observe the constitutional limits set by our parliamentary system upon the exercise of this beneficent power;
(iii) the restraint has two contemporary manifestations - one is the ambit of judicial intervention; the other covers the scope of the court's ability to quash an administrative decision on its merits;
(iv) these restrains bear the hallmarks of judicial control over administrative action;
(v) judicial review is concerned with reviewing not the merits of the decision in support of which the application for judicial review is made, but the decision-making process itself;
(vi) unless that restriction on the power of the court is observed, the court will, under the guise of preventing the abuse of power, be itself guilty of usurping power;
(vii) that the concern of the Court while exercising the power CWP-8015-2017 -51- of judicial review should be confined to, (a) whether a decision-making authority exceeded its powers; (b) committed an error of law; (c) committed a breach of the rules of natural justice;(d) reached a decision which no reasonable tribunal would have reached or; (e) abused its powers;
(viii) therefore, it is not for the Court to determine whether a particular policy or a particular decision taken in the fulfilment of that policy is fair;
(ix) the Court is only concerned with the manner in which those decisions have been taken;
(x) if the decision-maker understood correctly the law that regulates his decision-making power and has given effect to it, his decision cannot be said to be illegal, inviting interference;
(xi) a decision would be regarded as unreasonable if it is impartial and unequal in its operation;
(xii) a decision taken after taking into account all the factors which ought to be taken into account is ordinarily not to be held as unreasonable;
(xiii) if the scope of judicial review is too broad it would turn the various authorities/agencies into little more than media for transmission of cases to the courts and that would destroy the value of the agencies created to secure the benefit of special knowledge acquired through continuous administration in complicated fields;
(xiv) it is not the function of a Judge to act as a super board or with the zeal of a pedantic schoolmaster substituting its judgment for that of the administrator;
(xv) no judicial review by the non-expert Judge is permitted of the discretion exercised by the expert; and,
(xvi) if a Court were to review fully the decision of a body such as a State Board of medical examiners, it would find itself wandering amid the mazes of therapeutics of boggling at the mysteries of the pharmacopoeia - such a situation is not a case of the blind leading the blind but of one who has always been deaf and blind insisting that he can see and hear better than one who has always had his eyesight and hearing and has always used them to the utmost advantage in ascertaining the truth in regard to the matter in question.
Comments
Post a Comment